In 2005, Ireland's Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (CAHR) published a comprehensive report on the regulation of assisted reproduction and associated technologies. Yet since that report, successive Irish governments have failed to bring forth any legislation on this matter. This legislative inaction has resulted in a situation whereby the embryo in vivo has the right to life under the Irish Constitution, but embryos in vitro have no protection in law. Irish policymakers have also endorsed and funded embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) at a European level but continue to prevent researchers in Ireland from accessing any public funds for this research. The publication in October 2017 of the General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 is thus a welcome development. However, further reading of the Bill reveals that it is restrictive in nature and is likely to stifle research in Ireland. This article will discuss the legal, ethical and scientific developments that have occurred since the CAHR report and the impact, if any, they have had on the development of this Bill. It will critically reflect on provisions of the Bill as they relate to ESCR and make a number of suggestions for reform.
Introduction
Since the announcement of the creation of the first embryonic stem cell line almost 20 years ago, 1 attention has focused on the ethical and legal status of embryonic stem cell research. Found in an early-phase embryo, an embryonic stem cell has the potential to develop into any cell type in the body and can potentially be engineered to produce new tissues or organs, bringing new hope to those suffering from degenerative illness as well as other incurable diseases. Such prospects are exciting, however, embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) provokes heated debate which is often depicted as being polarized between two sharply contrasting perspectives; those who believe it is wrong to use the human embryo to achieve such benefits and those who support ESCR and emphasize the positive practical consequences that might ensue. 2 While other jurisdictions have tackled the thorny issue of how to regulate this ethically charged domain, 3 Ireland remains one of the few countries in Europe without any legislative scheme or national oversight of ESCR. This has resulted in a peculiar situation whereby the embryo in vivo has full constitutional protection through Article 40.3.3, but since the Supreme Court in Roche v. Roche 4 clarified that the embryo in vitro is not protected under this Article, it has had no protection in law.
The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (CAHR) published a comprehensive report in 2005, but successive governments failed to produce any legislation until October 2017 when a General Scheme of Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 was introduced. In the intervening 12 years since the publication of the CAHR and the General Scheme of this Bill, there have been considerable scientific developments in the realm of ESCR and embryo research, constitutional developments on the status of the embryo in Irish law and developments on the funding and patenting of ESCR at a European level.
On the face of it, this Bill is a welcome attempt to clarify the status of ESCR in Ireland. It should remedy the anomalous situation that sees Ireland funding ESCR at a European level, but preventing scientists in Ireland from accessing European funds. It should also serve as a much-needed opportunity to have a national debate on these issues in light of the passage of 12 years since the CAHR report. However, while the Bill does permit ESCR, a closer reading reveals that it is restrictive in nature and likely to stifle innovative research. It also fails to adequately consider the legal, ethical and scientific developments that have taken place since the publication of this Bill. This article fills this lacuna by critically examining the legal and ethical developments that have taken place in this intervening period. It will discuss induced pluripotent cell (IPSC) research and whether it diminishes the need for ESCR. It will consider the legal status of the embryo arising from the Roche v. Roche case and whether a European consensus has begun to emerge on the status of the embryo. Finally, it will reflect on the impact that these developments have had on the General Scheme of the Bill.
Ethical considerations and IPSCs
Found in an early-phase embryo, an embryonic stem cell has the potential to develop into any cell type in the body and can potentially be engineered to produce new tissues or organs, bringing hope to those suffering from degenerative illness as well as other incurable diseases. 5 As well as potential therapeutic benefit, stem cells may help us better understand the developmental process of the embryo and the causes of certain defects. The chief concern with ESCR is that it involves the destruction of the embryo. Herein lies what Devolder calls 'The Problem':
Either one supports embryonic stem cell research and accepts resulting embryo destruction, or one opposes embryonic stem cell research and accepts that the potential benefits of the research will be forgotten. 6 Presented as such, we seem to have a choice between destroying an embryo for its potential medical benefits and protecting the embryo at all costs. For many, the answer is less clear due to the uncertain status of the embryo; they may want the benefit of ESCR but may feel unease with embryo destruction. Although the moral status of the embryo has been discussed in detail elsewhere, 7 some of the main discussion points are worth noting here.
There are those who oppose ESCR due to the belief that it is ethically wrong because it destroys human persons at the embryonic stage of development. They believe that the embryo has the same moral status as that of a human being and, irrespective of its instrumental value, it can never be destroyed. 8 The practical implications of this are that all embryos fertilized in vitro must be implanted and certain contraceptive practices that are currently widely utilized in Ireland, such as the morning after pill, must be prohibited.
The middle ground 'gradualist' perspective regards the development of the early embryo into the foetus and gradually into the birth of a child, as part of a process upon which an embryo gradually acquires status as it develops. This was the position adopted 5 . For more on the potential of the research see Editorial, 'The Promise of Stem Cells', Nature by the Irish Council on Bioethics, which regarded the embryo as having significant but not full moral status and justified its position on the 'potentiality argument' 9 ; it is because of their potential to develop into a human being that embryos have some moral status and there must therefore be limits on the use of embryos for research purposes.
Lockwood argues that debates on the moral status of the embryo rarely achieve much as they are usually inconclusive.
10 This is perhaps valid and may explain why differences in regulatory approaches have emerged. Approaches to the regulation of ESCR have ranged from relatively 'liberal' policies in the United Kingdom, quite 'restrictive' policies, such as those in Germany which only permit ESCR on imported embryonic stem cell lines, to what could be perceived to be 'intermediate' policies as demonstrated in France, that permit ESCR on embryonic stem cell lines created from surplus embryos. Rarely are policies entrenched in a particular viewpoint of the embryo, but rather they reflect a political compromise.
11 Since the publication of the CAHR report, scientists have begun to understand the potential of IPSCs. These are reprogrammed adult stem cells that are pluripotent and have many similar characteristics to human embryonic stem cells (hESCs).
12 Acquiring these cells does not involve the destruction of an embryo and as such, they do not attract the same ethical controversy. 13 Thus if we support the aims of ESCR, but have unease with the destruction of the embryo in the process, IPSCs could possibly provide an ethically acceptable alternative.
A considerable amount of effort has gone into exploring this possible avenue of research, 14 however, if the goals of ESCR are to be fulfilled, focusing on IPSCs alone will not achieve this. There are a number of differences between hESCs and IPSCs and the impact that these differences may have on the function of the cells and safety is currently unclear.
15 These distinctions include genetic and epigenetic differences and the fact that the behaviour of each type of cell is more complex than previously thought. 16 Further, research on both types of cells is necessary to both understand and harness the potential of IPSCs and it is now considered that, rather than replace hESCs, IPSCs should complement them. 17 ESCR also began almost a decade earlier than research on IPSCs and is thus more advanced. For now, hESCs remain the 'gold standard' to which IPSCs will be compared 18 and realizing the potential of IPSCs requires ongoing ESCR. Rather than reducing the need for hESCs, Devolder suggests that IPSCs indirectly encourages ESCR, as hESCs will continue to be used as the control group. 19 However, IPSC research per se does not face the same ethical considerations as ESCR, and it is for this reason that the International Society for Stem Cell Research has stated that it does not require specialized review and it is also currently permitted in Ireland. 20 To understand the position of ESCR in Ireland, it is necessary to first outline the legal approach to regulating the in vivo embryo/foetus.
Legal status of the embryo in Ireland
Since 1983, the embryo/foetus located within the mother's body is referred to in the legislation as the 'unborn' and has been constitutionally protected with the insertion of the eighth amendment:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.
The purpose of Article 40.3.3 was to constitutionally prohibit abortion, but with the 'unborn' remaining undefined in Irish law, there had been much uncertainty as to whether the amendment went beyond abortion and protected the embryo in vitro. This lack of discussion as to the definition of the unborn and its impact, if any, on the embryo is one of the many shortcomings of the formulation and debate around the eighth amendment. The birth of the world's first child through in vitro fertilisation (IVF) had occurred 5 years previously 21 and, arguably, Parliament ought to have considered the wording of the amendment in light of this development. A proposed amendment in the Seanad to explicitly state that constitutional protection applies after implantation would have clarified the constitutional protection (vis-a`-vis the embryo in vitro), but this was rejected. 27 The case concerned a couple who underwent IVF treatment but subsequently separated. There were a number of frozen embryos left over which Mrs Roche wanted to implant, contrary to the wishes of Mr Roche. The Court had to determine, among other issues, whether the embryo in vitro came under the definition of the 'unborn' and if so, whether it was constitutionally protected. Both courts held that it is only upon implantation that an embryo is constitutionally protected. The courts were very clear that this case was not concerned with the moral status of the embryo or determining when life begins, 28 as there is 'no definite scientific or medical answer to that question'. 29 In essence, the courts felt that the constitutional and moral questions were distinct and their focus was on interpretation of the eighth amendment.
In considering the definition of the unborn, the courts noted that although the eighth amendment was inserted to constitutionally prohibit abortion, the text itself does not mention abortion, but rather confers on the unborn a positive right to life and arguably this text goes further than simply constitutionally prohibiting abortion. Binchy is unequivocal that the purpose of the amendment was wider and focused on protecting life in the early stages, to include the embryo in vitro. 30 Murray CJ, in determining that the issue was not justiciable, considered that if the intention was to limit the confines of the amendment to abortion, the Constitution would have contained an express prohibition, much like it did when the Constitution contained an express prohibition on divorce. Rather, the focus of the amendment was to afford a positive protection on all forms of early human life.
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In examining the historical purpose of the amendment and subsequent judgments, the majority of the Supreme Court noted that the courts had consistently endorsed the purpose of the eighth amendment as being to constitutionally prohibit abortion. 32 This was, however, the first case that required a consideration of the meaning of 'unborn' beyond the confines of a termination of pregnancy. Much weight was given to the phrase 'the right to life of the mother' and to the link between the unborn and the mother. This created a constitutional relationship between the mother and the unborn and it was only when this relationship existed that Article 40.3.3 was applicable. 33 Thus, any rights of the unborn under Article 40.3.3 were inextricably linked to those of the mother. This relationship was physical and only applied to a woman in the context of pregnancy and to an embryo upon implantation.
Yet such an interpretation of the Constitution is at odds with a purposive interpretation of Article 40.3.3. Such an interpretation does not view the eighth amendment as constitutionally prohibiting abortion but prohibits abortion through affording the unborn the right to life and with that, the best interests of the unborn is a consideration. 34 Until such time as Article 40.3.3 is repealed, this protection of the unborn may extend to keeping a clinically dead pregnant woman alive if it is in the best interests of the foetus. 37 Not only would this outlaw certain contraceptive practices, but it would also require the implantation of all embryos created through IVF, irrespective of viability and irrespective of the wishes of the parents. In view of Article 41.1.2, Denham J considered that this was outside the competence of the State, as a decision on whether or not to have children, including through IVF, is a private matter.
38 Consideration should also be given to the judgment of Finlay CJ in AG v. X who stated that the qualification 'as far as practicable' means that the Court has the discretion not to 'make orders which are futile, impractical or ineffective'. 39 Any decision that would have rendered common contraceptive practices illegal would certainly be futile, impractical or ineffective.
The courts were unequivocal that beyond the constitutional matter at hand, the issue as to the status of the embryo was for the government to resolve. The difficulty of the task was acknowledged as arguments that claim an embryo should be respected as other human life would be countered with the importance of embryo research for medical purposes. 40 However, while such matters required development of policy in a matter that is fraught with legal, ethical and moral complexity, Hardiman J observed that 'the fact that difficulties are raised does not absolve the legislature from the obligation'. 41 The learned judge stressed the need for legislation as 'Ireland may become by default an unregulated environment for practices that may prove controversial or, at least, give rise to a need for regulation '. 42 It is thus clear that legislation is necessary to clarify the status of the embryo and ESCR. Despite the courts' clear intention to leave decisions as to the status of the embryo with the legislature, there are a number of points worth noting. First, Fennelly J reflected in Roche that if they continued to abdicate their responsibility, the courts may be forced to consider the issue again. Although there is no constitutional provision explicitly referring to embryos, Fennelly and Geoghegan JJ hinted that an embryo could enjoy constitutional protection under some other article of the Constitution. This may perhaps come from one of the unenumerated rights under Article 40. 3, 43 but as yet remains unexplored. However, considering the importance of Article 41.1.2 in this debate, it is unlikely that the embryo would have full constitutional protection and the legislature should be mindful that any attempts to give full protection to an embryo would be unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge. Secondly, a determination of the status of the embryo is likely to be grounded on the notion of 'respect' for the embryo. Hardiman J considered that this respect lies in the embryo's capacity to become life 44 and in the view of Geoghegan J, the State's failure to indicate how this respect should be given 'is undesirable and arguably contrary to the spirit of the Constitution'. 45 Fennelly J also voiced his support for the view that there is a constitutional obligation to provide respect for the embryo in law. 46 McGuinness and Ui Chonnachtaigh argue that it would be unusual for a Constitution to give such strong protection to an embryo in utero and simultaneously give none to the embryo in vitro. 47 However, it is likely that while the protection may differ, the respect the courts seems to afford to embryos in vitro, and comments that the state is arguably failing in its constitutional duty to protect the embryo, would suggest that there is some, albeit unexploited, constitutional protection for the embryo in vitro.
Embryo research in Europe
While the protection of embryos in Ireland remains unsettled, there have been a number of developments in the European Union (EU). The competences of the EU traditionally lie in creating an internal market and economic union, 48 but the Commission has begun to take a more active role in health and technology since 2002 with the adoption of programmes on public health. 49 The EU has also committed itself to becoming a bigger player in the world economy through increased investment in research 50 and biotechnology 51 with the aim of improving public health. As part of this commitment to research and health, there has been activity on biological materials, 52 clinical trials 53 and the patenting of biotechnology. 54 However, the purpose of the EU is economic integration, not moral integration, 55 and there has been no attempt to harmonize health research ethics. Individual member states have been left to develop their own policies on ESCR.
The emergence of biotechnology has blurred the distinction between regulating technology and regulating ethics. Introducing policies on biotechnology, in particular controversial technologies, can implicitly endorse a particular ethical viewpoint, creating a tension between the need to harmonize biotechnology to further economic integration and the need to respect the constitutional traditions of member states. Ethics and biotechnology are not mutually exclusive, and the ethical challenges posed by new technologies are at the forefront of any regulatory discussion. Introducing an EU-wide policy that permits ESCR, even if subject to the laws of the member state, could imply an EU acceptance of the research and could suggest the emergence of a European consensus on this matter. Issues pertaining to the status of the embryo and embryo research are notoriously difficult to settle at a national level and become even more complicated at a supranational level where there are differing constitutional traditions and cultural values to consider. Nevertheless, policy that impacts on the embryo has been developed.
Funding ESCR in Europe
'Framework Programmes' (FPs) are the main financial tools through which the EU supports research and development activities, covering almost all scientific disciplines. FP6 (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ), adopted in 2002, was the first FP in which it was agreed to fund ESCR, a policy continued under FP7 and Horizon 2020. Despite the decision to fund the research in principle in 2002, a moratorium was agreed between the European Commission and the Council so as to give them time to put in place detailed provisions to implement this new policy. 56 During these discussions, the Commission was at pains to point out that the development of a funding policy for ESCR was 'not about establishing EU legislation on ethical questions', but rather its focus was on fostering collaborations to promote research that benefits the citizens of the EU 'while respecting national rules and values'. 57 The Commission thus committed itself to funding ESCR, leaving member states free to consider the ethical issues. 58 However, due to the nature of the research, it was not possible to ignore the ethical considerations and, perhaps mindful of the debate within member states, a number of rules were adopted. Collaborations were encouraged to avoid the duplication of research and the unnecessary destruction of embryos. Only surplus embryos (those left over after IVF treatment) prior to 27 June 2002 could be used to create an embryonic stem cell line 59 and it had to be proven that other research methods, such as adult stem cell research, would not yield the desired results of the research. 60 Importantly, research that is prohibited in a member state will not be funded. 61 funding framework, funding will only be granted if ESCR is permitted in the member state and the Commission's policy seems to align itself somewhat with Article 18 of the Oviedo Convention. Member states are free to decide on the fundamental issue of whether to permit ESCR, but the creation of embryos for research purposes is not permitted.
Instrumental
63 Similar to the stance of the Commission, the EGE stressed that it was not looking at the ethics of ESCR, but rather the focus was on the implementation of a funding policy. 64 Thus, both the approach of the EGE and the Commission to ESCR has been similar: both turned their attention away from the ethical debate.
Importantly, although not binding on member states, this funding framework represents the first European statement from the Commission on what can be done with the human embryo. It could also represent some, albeit limited, consensus on ESCR within Europe. The guidelines only apply to projects in receipt of European funds, but they are nonetheless an ESCR policy, a policy agreed by all member states which permits ESCR in certain circumstances. Interestingly, it is also a policy that was supported by the Irish government, which stated that should ESCR be permitted, it must be conducted with proper regulation and safeguards in place. 65 At the time, the government was awaiting the report of the CAHR and the status of the embryo had not been clarified by the Supreme Court, yet the Irish government approved these rules through a formal endorsement of the policy, and indirectly through the contribution of Irish taxes towards embryo research in Europe. EU funds cannot be spent on the derivation of the stem cell line and will therefore not fund the destruction of the embryo, but this policy is an acceptance of the research by both the Irish government and the EU. It also provides us with the first indication as to what the Irish government considers to be acceptable policy in the realm of ESCR.
Achieving this consensus is significant considering the diverging views across member states on this issue, and arguably, this minimum level of consensus is all that can be achieved considering the differing legal, ethical and cultural differences across the EU. 66 No further harmonization on ESCR should be attempted as it is unlikely to be possible to achieve, nor desirable to attempt. A framework such as this, which provides a funding mechanism for the research but leaves member states with the authority to permit or prohibit the research, is perhaps best in light of the differing approaches to ESCR across member states. For Irish policy, it brings many questions and contradictions since Ireland is not only permitting, but funding ESCR in other member states, yet prohibits such activities in its own jurisdiction. The policy lacks ethical consistency and is without legal foundation.
Patenting of ESCR in Europe
Irish policymakers have been unpersuaded by any legal or ethical justifications to introduce embryonic stem cell policy. However, favourable patenting policies for ESCR could bring an economic return and provide an economic incentive to provide regulatory oversight for this research in Ireland. Biotechnological research is expensive and cannot be dependent upon public funding only. Favourable patenting policies that make it possible to obtain a return on investment can encourage private investment in the research, as a patent gives inventors exclusive rights to monopolize their invention for 20 years. 67 It can stimulate medical research as it allows for compensation of research, and patients can benefit from the developments in diagnostics and therapeutics. 68 The patent holder can sell their patent under a licence agreement, opt to exploit the invention or simply do nothing with the patent, while still preventing others from using the patented product. The Nuffield Council notes that the securing of funding through the promise of a patent is likely to play a significant role 'in shaping the dynamics of scientific research and technological innovation'. 69 Thus, if inventions arising out of ESCR can be patented, scientists based in Ireland may be able to attract private funding.
The Biotechnology Directive was introduced to protect biotechnology inventions to ensure the continuing development of Community industries. 70 The Commission sought to remove barriers to the patenting of biotech inventions through this Directive and its purpose was to harmonize this area of law to promote research and develop biotechnology. 71 However, despite the perceived importance of biotechnology and the need for an EU Directive that specifies that biotechnological inventions are patentable, due to pressure from the Green lobby, the European Parliament exercised its veto power 72 and rejected the first draft of the Directive in 1995 for failing to contain a reference to morality. 73 A new version proposed by the Commission later that year included general and specific exclusions on public morality and was eventually passed in 1998. 74 Importantly for ESCR, Article 6(2)(c) prohibits the patenting of 'uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes', but once again embryos are not defined and it is also not clear whether embryonic stem cell lines come under the definition. The uncertainty over the patenting of ESCR is in part due to ESCR being in its infancy when the Directive was drafted, 75 but securing agreement would likely have been fateful to the Directive. Further guidance was necessary but the EGE was of the opinion that a decision on the patenting of ESCR inventions was closely linked to defining an embryo and both should be determined by national legislation in accordance with the nation's own laws and values. 76 Thus, further guidance or harmonization on this issue was deemed to be unnecessary. 77 Once again there was broad consensus, but disagreement with the detail. This perspective was challenged in the case of Brustle v. Greenpeace 78 where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was asked by the Federal Court of Justice of Germany to clarify the scope of Article 6(2)(c). The Court was asked to consider three specific questions: firstly, the definition of the embryo under the Directive; secondly, whether commercial exploitation for scientific research comes under the definition of 'uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes'; and finally, whether an invention that uses an embryo at any stage be precluded from patentability. 79 Concerning the first question, the Court noted that the lack of a definition coupled with a lack of reference to national laws implies that the term must have a uniform definition across the EU. 80 For the Court, this conclusion was supported by the aims and objectives of the Directive 81 which sought to harmonize patent protection across the EU. 82 While recognizing that there were debates across member states as to the status of the embryo, the Court was of the opinion that it was required to give a legal decision on the definition of the term 'human embryo' in the context of the Directive. 83 In other words, the Court had to provide a uniform definition for the embryo that would bind all member states when considering patent applications under the Biotechnology Directive. Significantly, the Court ruled that while the purpose of the Directive was to promote investment, the use of biological material must have regard for fundamental rights and in particular dignity, thus the term embryo must be given a broad definition. 84 Therefore, under the Directive, the CJEU ruled that a human embryo is formed once an egg is fertilized 85 but declined to state whether an embryonic stem cell line is considered an embryo under the Directive. This was a decision for the national courts to make in light of scientific developments. 86 Regarding the second question, the Court ruled that the use of embryos for scientific purposes is defined as 'the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes', 87 and that only uses 'for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it being patentable' can be patented. 88 Finally, and most importantly for ESCR, the Court stated that if an embryo is destroyed in the making of the invention, it is unpatentable, irrespective of how far removed the destruction of the embryo was from the patent application. 89 The Court considered that the commercialization of an invention that destroyed an embryo in its making would be an affront to dignity.
The European Patent Office (EPO) had previously decided in the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) case that if an embryo was destroyed in the making of an invention, it was unpatentable. 90 However, this decision is surprising, as it had previously been established policy that due to the presumption of patentability, exceptions to this general principle of patentability ought to be interpreted narrowly.
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Prior to the Brustle decision, some limited consensus perhaps had emerged in Europe: that is, that the embryo was deserving of protection and that the definition of an embryo was for individual countries to decide. There was a push to limit research to surplus embryos left over after IVF, but this was not successful. Thus, the judgment in Brustle is somewhat surprising. Despite the clear lack of consensus across Europe and the lack of a definition in the Directive, the Court held that an embryo is formed at fertilization. Although its decision is confined to commercialization, the decision is a worrying restrictive step, particularly in light of the differing legislative schemes of member states. 92 The Court in Brustle based its reasoning on the protection of dignity. In other words, to ensure respect for human dignity, a fertilized egg must be considered an embryo. Due to the wide level of protection needed, an embryo that is destroyed at any stage in the making of an invention cannot be patented; according to the CJEU, to commercialize ESCR would be contrary to human dignity. Consensus on these issues, particularly on the protection of embryos, has been notoriously difficult to achieve, and it is questionable whether more than the literal meaning should have been inferred from the Directive. The expansive nature of this decision is all the more surprising considering that the Directive was unlikely to have been drafted with ESCR in mind, and it is unclear whether the drafters considered it. It is a rather wide interpretation of a provision that was to be narrowly interpreted, requiring no moral decision to be made. 93 If a moral decision is to be made on the destruction of the embryo, it is by the member states under Article 6(1). A decision that hESCs do not fall under the exclusions would have not precluded member states from prohibiting the invention under Article 6(1) in line with its own legal and ethical framework, that is reflective of its own cultural values.
This decision has been somewhat limited by International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents.
94 Here, the CJEU held that to constitute a human embryo, the entity must have the capacity to develop into an embryo and this is a matter for the national courts to decide. 95 However, the crux of the Brustle decision, that the destruction of an embryo at any point in the making of the invention renders it unpatentable, remains in place. 
Council of Europe
There have also been some developments from the Council of Europe on this matter. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects 'the right to life'. Although the scope of that right is undefined, the ECHR has consistently left it within the margin of appreciation for member states to determine whether that should apply to the foetus as there is no consensus on a scientific or legal definition of the beginning of life.
96 Evans v. United Kingdom concerned the disposition of frozen embryos and the Court ruled unanimously that the issue as to the right to life comes within the margin of appreciation of member states. 97 The Court also noted:
Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider.
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The Convention for Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention) opened for signature in April 1997 and came into force in December 1999. It is, to date, the only binding international instrument concerning bioethics, biomedicine and human rights. The Convention deals with, among other things, patient rights, genetic testing and scientific research. It also permits, under Article 18, research on embryos in vitro, provided there is adequate protection of the embryo, but prohibits the creation of embryo for research purposes. At best, it is a basic framework on biomedicine from which States are required to implement and enact legislation on the subject matter. It could also be considered a consensus statement on some of these issues. However, a deeper examination reveals consensus as to Article 18 to be superficial.
Although the Convention was developed prior to the CAHR, discussions since then have focused on the embryo that may be influential. First the term 'human embryo' is not defined in the Convention and the Working Party on the Protection of the Human Embryo and Foetus agreed that while there is broad agreement across Europe on the need to protect the embryo in vitro, consensus on the status of the embryo remains elusive. 99 This lack of definition is unremarkable when one considers the diversity of approach in Europe. In Spain, the term only applies 14 days after fertilization, while in Germany, it applies from the moment of fertilization. Second, with the exception of creating embryos for research purposes, it leaves States free to decide whether to permit embryo research, provided there is adequate protection in place. Thus, ESCR is not forced upon member states and the restrictions are limited to the sources of embryos and ensuring there are safeguards to protect the embryo. It echoes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that largely leaves these issues within the margin of appreciation of member states. Yet Article 18 has faced criticism from Germany which argues that it is too liberal and contravenes its laws on embryo protection and the United Kingdom which has failed to ratify the Convention as it permits the creation of embryos for research. 101 Thus, while there is an agreement in place pertaining to embryos in vitro, any perception of consensus is illusory.
2005-2017: Legislative malaise in Ireland
During this period, a tentative consensus emerged within Europe: There was recognition that ESCR should occur, but that no extra embryos should be created for this purpose. Further, the research should only be conducted when methods such as adult stem cell or IPSC research cannot yield the same results. Although IPSC research is not without its ethical concerns, the research itself is seen as ethically uncontroversial as adult stem cell research and is thus encouraged as an alternative to ESCR. This consensus is reflective of a restrictive attitude to ESCR and no further agreement on this matter is likely.
In Ireland, clarification on the constitutional status of the embryo had, in fact, little impact. The Supreme Court has definitively stated that an IVF embryo does not fall within the protection of Article 40.3.3 and while the Court declined to pronounce on its status, it suggested that it is worthy of respect. In the face of legislative reluctance, both University College Cork and Trinity College Dublin developed guidelines permitting ESCR. 102 Although both policies broadly reflected the recommendations contained in the Irish Council for Bioethics report, it meant that there was no national conversation on this research and national oversight was lacking. However, despite there being no legal impediment to ESCR in Ireland, scientists in Ireland continued to be prevented from developing ESCR technology. In the aftermath of the Roche decision, the biggest funders of science in Ireland, Science Foundation Ireland and the Health Research Board, announced that on instruction from the Department of Health, no ESCR would be funded as the Department was preparing regulations on assisted reproduction. This moratorium on funding extended to EU funds and, in part due to the complexity of this therapy, largescale investment from biotechnology companies has been slow to materialize. de facto ban remained in place. This ban has had no impact on IPSC research in Ireland. While researchers cannot use an embryonic control, IPSC research is ongoing.
Brustle also removed a clear financial incentive for biotechnology companies to invest in the research and may have dampened government enthusiasm to either fund the research or engage in a debate on the status of the embryo. Ireland's Innovation 2020 strategy is seeking an increase in Ireland's scientific capacity and infrastructure. Ireland has a growing reputation for adult stem cell research, attracting both national and international funding, and the licensing of therapies from this research has begun. 104 The development and growth of ESCR in Ireland could complement this growing reputation, but the Innovation 2020 strategy puts a strong focus on securing intellectual property (IP) rights from publically funded research to support innovation. 105 ESCR would therefore fall outside of this strategy. This lack of IP protection came under scrutiny during the discussions of Horizon 2020 when the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament voted against funding ESCR on the grounds that it cannot be patented. 106 The aim of Horizon 2020 is to stimulate European competitiveness and the inability to secure IP rights on ESCR research precludes ESCR from contributing to Europe's competiveness. Ultimately, it was decided to fund ESCR as part of Horizon 2020, but Brustle may impact future policy initiatives and may have had an impact in Ireland.
Finally, by failing to legislate for the embryo for 12 years, there was an implicit decision to leave it with no protection in law. In stark contrast to the full legal status of the embryo in vivo, successive Irish governments have offered the embryo in vitro no protection. The status of the embryo depends on its environment alone, a policy that is without a strong moral foundation and has been discussed, potentially contrary to the Constitution. Environment can increase the potential of an embryo to develop into a human being, but it ignores the inherent characteristics of the embryo that contribute to this potentiality. Some of these characteristics (both genetic and moral) can have significant bearing on the status of the embryo that exist independently of its environment. No decision on the status of the embryo will be free of ethical criticism. Indeed it may not be the inherent characteristics of the embryo, but rather its representation as the earliest forms of life that is deemed to be morally significant. However, legislation on this matter is essential to ensure that the embryo is respected in law, to ensure that researchers can access public funding for ESCR and not leave ESCR solely dictated by a policy on public funds. It is also necessary to have a national dialogue on such matters and not leave them to the privy of local research institutions.
General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017
In October 2017, the General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill was published. The Bill outlines a draft statutory framework to govern assisted reproduction and associated research. Specifically, it makes provisions for gamete and embryo donation for use in assisted human reproduction treatment and research; surrogacy; posthumous assisted reproduction; pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and sex selection; and ESCR and IPSC research. It also introduces an independent Regulatory Authority for Assisted Human Reproduction.
The Bill is a welcome development. Years of legislative inaction have prevented embryo research and ESCR from occurring in Ireland. However, the Bill as it stands is restrictive in nature, leaves the proposed Regulatory Authority with very limited powers to consider new and emerging developments in this area and will have an unwarranted and negative impact on IPSC research in Ireland. This Bill as it stands views ESCR as a by-product of assisted reproduction: Research is only permitted on those embryos left over after assisted reproduction. The Bill fails to consider the wider scientific and ethical justifications for permitting ESCR as an activity in and of itself.
Definition of an embryo
The first indication of the restrictive nature of the Bill is in Head 2, whereby a human embryo is defined as an entity that is 'formed by the fertilization of a human egg by a human sperm'. 107 This definition is similar to that of the CJEU in Brustle, although Irish policymakers were under no obligation to embrace such a definition. Brustle pertains to patenting cases only and has no application to the definition of an embryo in the context of research. By adopting such a definition, Irish policymakers have ignored the problems that come with overly prescriptive definitions that are based on fertilization encountered in other jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, the definition of an embryo under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990 was originally defined in the context of fertilization but was later changed to include 'any other process by which the embryo was created began outside the human body'.
108 Such a change came about as a result of a challenge as to whether the HFE Act 1990 encompassed embryos created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), 109 and a recommendation that all human embryos, regardless of the mode of creation of the embryo, should fall within the regulations set down by the HFE Act 1990. Embryos created through SCNT are cloned embryos. The process is often referred to as 'therapeutic cloning' as they are cloned for research purposes and not reproduction.
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A stem cell line created through such as process will be genetically identical to its recipient and is likely to be of great benefit in the field of regenerative medicine. Due to the potential benefit of embryos created through SCNT, the CAHR recommended that their use should be permitted for research purposes. 112 The definition of the embryo as it stands not only restricts the possible sources of a stem cell line but also leaves the Bill scientifically outdated before it has even become law.
Heads 59 and 60 provide an explicit prohibition of the use of embryos through SCNT. Head 59 prevents the creation of embryos for research purposes (and that includes through SCNT) as the availability of spare embryos left over after IVF provides a ready source of embryos and no justification for creation thus exists. Head 60 prohibits the cloning of embryos and a discussion of SCNT is incorporated into that of reproductive cloning, with no distinction made between reproductive and therapeutic cloning.
The prohibition of SCNT is thus problematic on two grounds. First, the ethical considerations involved in reproductive cloning are distinct from therapeutic cloning.
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Reproductive cloning is generally perceived to be an affront to human dignity and a threat to human identity. However, the purpose of therapeutic cloning is to create a cell line for the treatment of a particular disease or use in a therapy. This brings us to the second issue -there are clear scientific justifications for the creation of embryos for this purpose, arguments which the Bill fails to consider or address.
Permitted research
The value of the Bill is its clarification of the permitted grounds for ESCR: Research that can lead to advances in knowledge, treatments or other procedures relating to assisted human reproduction, or the knowledge or treatment of serious diseases or other serious medical conditions is to be permitted. 114 This is almost identical to the funding policies under Horizon 2020 and complies with the Oviedo Convention. Importantly for researchers in Ireland, such clarification will enable access to public funding of research. Importation of stem cell lines is also permitted, provided they only come from spare embryos. This will enable scientists in Ireland to access cell lines from bodies such as the European Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, thereby helping to avoid unnecessary creation of embryonic stem cell lines, as required under Horizon 2020 guidelines.
The Supreme Court in Roche made it clear that the embryo is deserving of respect, and consideration must be given as to whether this Bill meets that requirement. Report and has formed the basis of the regulation of IVF and ESCR in the United Kingdom and around the world. 115 Questions have been asked around whether it is ethically consistent to permit embryos to be used for research while maintaining that they have special respect. 116 The answer likely lies in the status afforded to the embryo. If one accepts that the embryo has an intermediate interpretation somewhere between being a clump of cells and having full moral status, then some limited form of research is permitted. 117 By restricting the use of embryos for research to only the most serious of diseases and having clear oversight of the research, the Bill satisfies that requirement. The Bill also prohibits the creation of embryos as being currently unwarranted and unjustified due to the availability of embryos left over after IVF. Restricting the creation of embryos for research purposes is thus currently justified on grounds of respecting the embryo provided this supply of embryos remains, although embryos created through SCNT should be an exception to this rule for reasons outlined above.
Head 63 prohibits the development of an embryo beyond day 14 and justifies this on the basis that it 'is a widely established cut-off point because it is the stage at which the primitive streak develops'. However, this stance ignores recent scientific developments in this field in which it may now be possible to develop an embryo beyond day 14. 118 It is acknowledged that very little is known about the developmental process of the human embryo from day 14 and that research on these embryos make offer useful insight into congenital defects and improve IVF practices. 119 In light of these developments, debates on the extension of this rule have begun elsewhere, but no opportunity for such a debate has been given in this Bill. Once again, we may see provisions in this Bill quickly becoming outdated.
IPSC research
Arguably, the greatest problem with the Bill lies in a restriction of IPSC research which lacks any express legal, ethical or scientific justification and which is out of step with international best practice. Head 62(3)(c) states that embryo, ESCR and IPSC research is only permitted where the aims of the research cannot be achieved through alternative forms of research. Head 63(1) puts the same regulatory requirements on IPSC research as ESCR. Thus, researchers who are currently conducting IPSC research in Ireland will now be expected to make an application to the proposed Regulatory Authority to conduct ISPC research, and it must be proven that the research cannot be done by any other means that does not require the use of IPSC research. The justification for introducing such a policy is stated in the explanatory notes as being that while 'their source (i.e. adult somatic cells) is not controversial, the potential uses to which they can be put are similar to hESCs'.
As IPSC research is still relatively in its infancy, the development of ESCR in tandem with IPSC research is encouraged. IPSC research is thus not free from any claims of moral complicity. The technology emerged out of ESCR and for now, the technology is very much linked to ESCR and continues to develop within this context. 120 However, this proposed policy does not make much sense from an ethical standpoint. The purpose of IPSC and ESCR is uncontroversial: It is hoped that it will lead to treatment and cures for the most serious degenerative diseases. It is the source of the cells that goes to the heart of the problem: In the development of ESCR, an embryo will be destroyed. It is for this reason that limits are put on the source of cells and parameters of the research. IPSC research, although inadvertently supporting the development of ESCR, is free from the ethical considerations that we see with ESCR and free from the ethical considerations that require the additional oversight for ESCR which is explicitly stated in this Bill. The source of IPSC research is as ethically unproblematic as adult stem cell research and the aims of IPSC research are laudable. It is for this reason that the International Society for Stem Cell Research has stated that IPSC research does not require the same specialized review as ESCR. 121 Funding requirements under Horizon 2020 similarly do not contain any such requirements for IPSC research. Requiring this extra layer of regulatory approval for IPSC research has no ethical or legal justification and is out of step with international best practice.
The Regulatory Authority
Finally, a fundamental problem with this Bill, and linked to each of the points above, is that it is overly prescribed and gives insufficient power to the proposed Regulatory Authority to regulate these new and emerging technologies. First, despite the clear scientific justification for embryos created through SCNT, it restricts its use and closely links it to reproductive cloning. Second, it restricts the creation of embryos beyond day 14. Third, although a consideration of the ethical and scientific arguments for mitochondrial donation are beyond the scope of this article, 122 both the use of these techniques and research into these techniques are prohibited. This ban is partly justified on the basis of safety concerns and lack of knowledge of the long-term impact of such techniques. While such concerns could justify restricting the use of the techniques in humans, it is no basis for a prohibition on research. Appeals to safety for the purposes of research are unwarranted as it is through further research that concerns regarding the safety and long term impact of a new therapy can be resolved.
These restrictions on research are unwarranted and in the future may force patients in Ireland to go abroad for therapies that use such embryos. It also reveals a real lack of confidence in the proposed Regulatory Authority and its associated committees. Under the Bill, approval from a Scientific and Ethics Committee of the Authority will be required before any research can take place. Provided they are appropriately staffed, such committees will be better placed to consider the scientific justifications, safety concerns and the ethical considerations of embryo research than what has been considered in the Bill. Permitting research on embryos beyond day 14 may 'lead to advances in knowledge, treatments or other procedures relating to assisted human reproduction' that cannot be carried out on other embryos. Permitting the creation of embryos through SCNT and mitochondrial research may lead to treatments that cannot come from other sources of embryos. The Bill should be amended to reflect these advances, but also acknowledge that the Scientific and Ethics Committee are best placed to consider these issues. Additionally, under Head 63, such licences will only be approved after approval from a research ethics committee, thus creating an additional layer of approval. The explanatory notes under Head 70 state that the Regulatory Authority can outline the criteria necessary for the granting of a licence 'as this is likely to be a dynamic process as technology and medical standards change', but the Bill is so restrictive that the Authority will be unable to consider these current, new and emerging technologies.
Conclusion
Through the publication of this Bill, Ireland continues to belatedly follow developments elsewhere and refuses to lead on any of these issues. Irish policymakers have also failed to take advantage of the wide ranging debate on many of these issues in other jurisdictions. There are sound scientific justifications for permitting the creation of embryos through SCNT and research on mitochondrial transfer. The requirement of specialized review for IPSC research is not only out of step with international best practice but defies logic.
In the 12 intervening years since the publication of the CAHR Report, while successive Irish governments have failed to introduce legislation, the Irish courts and the CJEU have been forced to consider some of the issues that go to the heart of embryo research. Almost all countries have regulations that reflect the viewpoint that an embryo has some moral significance. 123 The General Scheme of the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 2017 is a welcomed and long overdue development enabling Irish society to consider the complex moral, ethical and legal issues of ESCR. It will bring much-needed certainty and the conditions under which embryo and ESCR is permitted are now clear. However, it is unduly restrictive in nature, brings new and unnecessary regulation to IPSC research, and perhaps reflects a particular conservative political agenda for ESCR and embryo research, rather than being based on any concern for regenerative research in Ireland. Already the Bill is out of date on some matters and likely soon fall behind international best practice in other areas, necessitating legislative reform should this Bill become law. During the coming months, Irish policymakers must consider these issues and consider the scientific and ethical justification for permitting other forms of ESCR and embryo research. Finally, policymakers must place greater trust in the proposed Regulatory Authority and acknowledge that it will be best placed to oversee this rapidly developing technology.
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